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FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

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INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHMFIS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000720

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV

TREASURY FOR FBOYE

PARIS FOR WBAIN

LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019

TAGS: PGOV MA

SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: PREPARATIONS FOR THE BIG FOUR SUMMIT

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 710

1B. ANTANANARIVO 713

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

11. (C) Summary: Mediator Tiebile Drame told the Ambassador October 14 that ousted President Ravalomanana was becoming increasingly radical in his negotiating position. Ambassador Marquardt and Ambassador Carter will meet with Ravalomanana the morning of October 15 to explain that he must get on board the transition government train or risk being left at the station. If Ravalomanana fails to reach agreement with the other three movement leaders on Rajoelina leading the transition and the division of other transition seats at the "summit" planned for October 17-18 in Geneva, his movement will likely splinter. Each movement plus seven delegation leaders are invited to attend the Geneva meeting, which is largely being organized by Drame. Post plans to provide USD 10,000 to support this critical meeting and requests additional funds from Washington if available (ref B). End summary.

Ravalomanana Hardens Stance

12. (C) UN Mediator Tiebile Drame told the Ambassador October 14 that ousted President Ravalomanana was becoming increasingly radical in his negotiating position, including demanding concessions he already lost during negotiations in Maputo, while de facto transition leader Andry "TGV" Rajoelina was becoming more desperate to resolve the political crisis. Ravalomanana told his supporters via phone at the Magro rally October 13 that "he would not accept a putschist as the head of state." Drame said that according to the French Ambassador to South Africa, the South African Secret Service has even had to intervene to block Ravalomanana's son-in-law from attempting to put together a military operation, supposedly that would support Ravalomanana's forceful return to his country. The accuracy of this report is debatable, but certainly Ravalomanana has hardened his stance vis-a-vis the mediation and is refusing to take phone calls even from President Chissano or Drame. Ambassador Marquardt and Ambassador Carter will meet with Ravalomanana the morning of October 15 to explain that he must get on board the transition government train or risk being left at the station. President Zuma planned to call Ravalomanana October 14 to deliver a similar message, according to Drame. Drame will travel to South Africa October 15 and will attempt to see Ravalomanana in person.

Ravalomanana's Movement May Go Along without Him

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¶3. (C) If Ravalomanana fails to reach agreement with the other three movement leaders on Rajoelina leading the transition and the division of other transition seats at the "summit" planned for October 17-18 in Geneva, his movement will likely splinter. Some of his staunchest supporters, including the Malagasy Ambassador to South Africa and his movement leader Fetison Rakoto Andrianirina, have already confided to the Ambassador that they are prepared to dump Ravalomanana and move forward without him if he refuses to play ball. The French are already prepared to support a "consensus" of three movements without Ravalomanana, while the Germans may be prepared to accept a consensus of four movements, but only three leaders, if Ravalomanana refuses to go along and his movements splinters.

Monja Roindefo Will Leave

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¶4. (C) According to Drame, HAT prime minister Monja Roindefo has agreed to accept the offer to head the transition senate in return for vacating his prime minister seat. This should open the door to the formation of a consensus, transition government by new Prime Minister Eugene Mangalaza, following decisions on the division of ministerial seats to be taken at the October 17-18 summit. CHOD Colonel Andre Ndriarijaona and Armed Forces Minister Colonel Noel Rakotonandrasana also told Drame, as Andre had told the Ambassador (ref A), that they would not intervene to help Monja retain his post.

Request for Financial Support

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¶5. (C) Each movement plus seven delegation leaders are invited to attend the summit in Geneva, which is largely being organized by Drame. Chissano is supportive of the effort, but otherwise occupied, while AU mediator Ouedraogo is not cooperating with the others. The Swiss have agreed to contribute USD 50,000, the Germans are assisting with transportation, and Post will contribute USD 10,000, as a PA grant but requests additional funds from Washington to support this critical meeting for the installation of the transition and eventual return to constitutional order (ref B). The TGV delegation will depart in the evening of October 15 for Geneva.

Comment: Three Leaders, Four Delegations May Work

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¶6. (C) Comment: A transition government without the participation of Ravalomanana's movement is like a table with three (or perhaps only two) legs. However, if many of his supporters were to go along without him and participate, the venture would have a greater chance of success. If Ravalomanana is making realistic political calculations, it seems unlikely that he would push himself into such an isolated corner, but of course, the political decisions of this stubborn, autocratic, businessman have often been anything but reasonable. While the international community and the USG should apply maximum pressure to Ravalomanana to ensure that he remains part of this solution, TGV should also be encouraged to abstain from running for president. Although it was agreed by the four leaders in the first round of Maputo negotiations that all four leaders would be able to run, the idea proposed by Ravalomanana's delegation leader Fetison that they would accept Rajoelina leading the transition if he refrained from running for president seems to be a good compromise that would also support the democratic principle that coup leaders should not be able to run in elections that they organize. End comment.

STROMAYER